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Located at the geographical intersection between East and West, with both 
Mediterranean and Black Sea coasts, Turkey was always a country with large movements 
of people. There were several waves of forced (ethnic) movement of people as a 
consequence of the collapse of the Ottoman Empire and the following nation-building 
process in the Turkish neighborhood.  
In the post-Second world war period, Turkey became a country of emigration. In 1961 a 
bilateral agreement on labor recruitment between Turkey and Germany had been signed. 
In the following years, similar bilateral agreements were reached with a couple of other 
European countries (Austria, Belgium, France, the Netherland and Sweden).  
Nowadays, things have changed. Turkey is still a country of emigration. But it has also 
become a country of immigration and transit.
1 And therefore, it faces similar challenges of 




 In this paper, we concentrate on the emigration flows.  
1. A Look Back 
In the times of the “Gastarbeiter” system of the 1960s until the early 1970s about 800.000 
Turkish workers were recruited to Western Europe.
3
                                                           
1 See: Transatlantic Academy: Getting to Zero: Turkey, its Neighbors and the West. Washington DC, June 
2010 (
 After the economic turbulences as a 
consequence of the first Oil crisis Western European countries stopped the recruitment of 
non-EC-workers. However, those already working in the European Community (EC) could 
stay and many would even allowed the right to family reunification. Thus, the number of 
www.transatlanticacademy.org), and Içduygu, Ahmet and Sert, Deniz, Türkei. Focus Migration 
Länderprofil. Nr.5, April 2009. HWWI, Hamburg, http://www.focus-
migration.de/Tuerkei_Update_04_2.6026.0.html.  
2 See: Tolay, Juliette: Turkey’s Other Multicultural Debate: Lessons for the EU. Annual Sakip Sabanci 
International Research Award Winning Lecture. Istanbul, June 2010. 
3 Still the best analysis of the Guest Worker Program is: Martin, Philip L.: The Unfinished Story: Turkish 
Labour Migration to Western Europe, with Special Reference to the Federal Republic of Germany. ILO, 
Geneva 1991; for a more recent and more general evaluation of the Guest Worker System see Martin Philip 
L.: Managing Labor Migration in the Twenty-first Century. Yale University Press, New Haven and London, 
2006.  2 
 
people with a Turkish background living in the European Union (EU) has further increased 
to about 2.74 million in 2008 (see Table 1). 
In recent decades there have been five main types of emigration of Turkish citizens to the 
EU area:
  “family-related emigration; asylum-seeking; irregular (undocumented or 
clandestine) labor emigration; contract-related (low-skilled) labor emigration; and 




Table 1: Turkish Migrant Stock Abroad in 1985 and 2008 (in million) 
   1985 
in % of 
Total  1995 
in % of 
Total  2008 
in % of 
Total 
Germany  1.40  59  2.05  62  1.89  56 
Total Europe  1.99  84  2.84  86  2.74  81 
Middle East  0.20  8  0.13  4  0.11  3 
Ex Soviet Union  0  0  0.05  2  0.08  2 
Total  2.36  100  3.31  100  3.38  100 
Source:  Içduygu, Ahmet.  Turkey and International Migration 2008 (SOPEMI Report for 
TURKEY 2008/09). Istanbul, 2009 (mimeo), table 20. 
 
As can be seen from Table 1 about 3.38 million people with Turkish background live 
outside Turkey today, 40% more than in 1985. By far most Turkish citizens have gone to 
Germany, where about 1,9 million people with Turkish background live, nowadays. While 
the total has not changed a lot since the mid-1990s, the geographical distribution has 
become different. In the mid-1990s about 86% of Turks living abroad were in Europe. This 
share has declined to about 80% today.  
Migration flows to Europe are down  to 50-60,000 a year. Overwhelmingly they occur 
through family formation or family  reunification.  As reported by the German Federal 
Statistical Office (Destatis) on the basis of provisional results, 30.000 persons from Turkey 
immigrated to Germany in 2009 and 40.000 people have left Germany with the 
destination “Turkey”. Hence, the migration balance has changed its sign and more people 
migrate from Germany to Turkey, than people migrate from Turkey to Germany.
5
More Turkish citizens have gone to the countries of the former Soviet Union. However, 
compared to the total, the emigration flows to the close neighborhood have remained 
very small. This is also true for the emigration flows from Turkey to the Middle East. Only 
about 3% of all Turkish citizens living abroad have gone to the Middle East. 
  
                                                           
4 Içduygu, Ahmet: Turkey and International Migration 2008 (SOPEMI Report for TURKEY 2008/09), Istanbul, 
2009 (mimeo), page 9. 
5 German Federal Statistical Office (Destatis): Level of immigration into Germany increasing again in 2009. 
Press release No.185 / 2010-05-26; Wiesbaden. The data include German pensioners (“snow birds”) and also 
the return of Germans with Turkish background to their country of birth (i.e. Turkey). Thus, the change in the 
stock of people with a Turkish background living in Germany might not correspond to these flow data! 3 
 
Figure 1: Where have Turkish citizens gone? Turkish Migrant Stock Abroad (in Thousands) 
 
Source: Içduygu, Ahmet and Sert, Deniz: Türkei. Focus Migration Länderprofil. Nr. 5, April 
2009, HWWI, Hamburg, page 8, figure 2. 
 
Interestingly enough, the asylum channel, heavily and controversially debated in the EU 
and especially in Germany in the 1990s, does not play an important role anymore. Just as 
an example, figure 2 shows the strongly declining number of asylum seekers with Turkish 
origin in Germany in the last decade.  
 
Figure 2: Asylum seekers with Turkish origin in Germany 1998-2008 
 
Data Source: Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge (BAMF): Asyl in Zahlen 2008. 
Nürnberg, 2009 
(http://www.bamf.de/cln_101/nn_441594/DE/DasBAMF/Statistik/statistik-
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2. A Look Ahead 
What will be the size of the Turkish migration potential to the EU and especially Germany 
in the future? The answer to this question depends on two factors: the individual behavior 
(i.e. the willingness to emigrate) on the micro level and on the size and development of 
the population on the macro level. 
 
2.1 Theoretical Expectations 
The necessary condition for the existence of a migration potential is the individual 
willingness of people to migrate. Therefore, at the micro level it is the individual utility 
function that determines the propensity to migrate. The higher (lower) the average 
individual migration propensity is, the higher (lower) is the migration potential.  
Individual utility function means that  individuals  compare  the utility levels (that they 
expect to reach with their own individual options, (financial) abilities and skills) of either 
the actual place of stay or every alternative place. Thereby, “utility”  is defined in the 
broadest possible way. It means basically “standard of living”. It contains economic 
(material) factors (such as income, employment possibilities, purchasing power and 
others), and non-economic (immaterial) factors (such as seniority, social acceptance, 
cultural well behavior, language and others) as well.  
A useful migration model has to include the possibility of migration flows being 
determined by relative deprivation (i.e. the motivation to reach a relatively better position 
within the social ranking of a reference group). In this perspective, the migration decision 
is an effective strategy to improve a person's income position relative to others in the 
person’s reference group, and, consequently, it differs accordingly to the perceived relative 
deprivation.  
Furthermore, migration models have to cope with the analysis of family migration (or a 
joint group of migrants and non-migrants) as opposed to individual migration. Migration-
decision is often an intra group interaction within a cooperative-game framework. In this 
view, migration is a calculated strategic behavior that yields a higher payoff to anyone of 
the family members than a non-migration alternative. Within such a framework it 
becomes possible to consider the issue of risk in migration decision-making. By sending 
one of the members abroad, the family's income portfolio is more broadly distributed. For 
some families, therefore, international migration becomes an optimal strategy to reduce 
the risks of income earning. 
Migration models have to understand migration as a process of innovation, adoption and 
diffusion. Why are some individuals quicker to migrate than others? An answer to that 
question is related to the problem of risk and the possibilities of lowering it, which opens 
the field of research to the inclusion of lags in the migration process. If relatives, friends or 
other people from the country of potential future emigration have moved to another 
country in a previous period, information about the destination country will flow back to 
the place of origin. This information will reduce the uncertainty of subsequent emigration 
for those remaining. If such information increases the probability of migrating, we could 
assume that individuals with this additional information would be quicker to respond to 5 
 
the emergence of the expectation of higher utility in some destination countries –  a 
potential answer to the question why some people move faster than others. 
Finally, migration models have to acknowledge that immobility has an economic value. It 
allows people to use their specifically local know-how for earning an income (i.e. mainly 
on the labour market) and for spending that income (consumption decisions). This 
specifically local know-how cannot be transferred. It would be lost in the case of migration 
and would have to be acquired once more at the new place of residence. Precisely this 
value of immobility explains why most people prefer to stay even if “to go” seems to be an 
attractive alternative at first glance. For most people, however, the second glance clearly 
shows that the value of immobility is higher than the expected net present value of a 
move abroad. Consequently, it is a very rational individual behaviour to stay. The large 
majority of people want to live, work and stay immobile where they have their roots. 
People prefer the status quo to an unfamiliar or insecure change. The simple abolishment 
of legal impediments to migration is usually insufficient to overcome individual 
(microeconomic, social and cultural) obstacles to migration and to overshoot the value of 
immobility. 
For a macro analysis of the migration potential, individual behavior has to get into an 
aggregated function. This is done by taking into account the population size of a country. 
The migration potential is (ceteris paribus) the larger (smaller), the larger (smaller) the 
population size is.  
 
2.2 Empirical Considerations 
If we take the most important macroeconomic factors causing migration, we might end 
up with population development and standard of living differences. They allow to stylize 
the migration pattern to be expected between Turkey and Europe in the next decades.  
On the one hand, the EU is facing the challenge of an ageing problem together with low 
fertility rates and declining working populations. On the other hand, Turkey’s population 
grows fast.  
Figure 3 shows the projections of population developments for Germany and Turkey over 
the next forty years. It becomes clear that while in Germany population is expected to 
decline, in Turkey it will increase. Therefore in Turkey, the population development might 
lead to an excess supply of labor and in Germany; it might lead to an excess demand for 









Figure 3: Population Projections for Germany and Turkey 2010 to 2050 
 
Data Source: Population Division of the Department of Economic and Social Affairs of the 
United Nations Secretariat, World Population Prospects: The 2008 Revision, 
http://esa.un.org/unpp. 
 
Analysing the differences in the average standard of living as another crucial determinant 
of migration, one aspect is o special importance. The individual reaction on differences in 
the average standard of living or the average income per capita does not follow a linear 
function. Rather, it behaves logarithmically. This means that the individual migration 
propensity is stronger in the case of larger income gaps but becomes weaker in the case of 
smaller income gaps. Individual migration propensity  might even land at a saturation 
border that will reduce incentives to migrate long before an equalisation of incomes is 
achieved. Thus, the speed of change is important. It makes a big difference whether the 
income gap is declining rapidly or not. 
Figure 4 shows the rather wide gap in the average standard of living between Turkey and 
Germany by comparing the per capita GDP measured in purchasing power parities US-$. 
The gap has declined. In 1980 the GDP per capita in Turkey reached about 20% of the 
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Figure 4: Per Capita GDP (in Purchasing Power Parities US-$)* in Turkey and Germany, 1980 
to 2008 
 
*In this figure Purchasing Power Parity US-$ have been used to reflect the standard of 
living and its difference between Turkey and Germany. 
Data Source: World Bank: World Development Indicators. 
 
Just to show, how long a catching up process will last; figure 5 reflects a simple simulation 
exercise. It is assumed that in the next decades the GDP in Turkey will grow faster than 
the German GDP. The simulation shows that under this assumption that the German GDP 
grows with a constant rate of 2% per year, the Turkish GDP has to grow by 3% to keep the 
existing gap of the GDP per capita vis-à-vis Germany stable. The more rapid growth of 
Turkish GDP is just needed to compensate for the more rapid Turkish population growth. 
If the Turkish economy grows by 4% per year (and the German GDP stays by 2% per year) 
the Turkish GDP per capita will reach half the size of the German GDP per capita by 2040. 
If it grows even with 5% per year the 2:1 gap is reached by 2025. The simulation exercise is 
just supposed to make it clear, how long a quiet substantial gap of the average standard 
of living will persist between Germany and Turkey, even if the Turkish economy is growing 

































































































































Figure 5: Simulation of the Gap in Per Capita GDP (in Purchasing Power Parities US-$)* 
between  Turkey and Germany, 2008 to 2050 under the assumption of different annual 
growth rates for the GDP 
 
*In this figure Purchasing Power Parity US-$ have been used to reflect the standard of 
living and its difference between Turkey and Germany. 
Data Source: World Bank: World Development Indicators. 
 
3. What Should Be Expected? 
It is no question. Regarding the diverse population developments in Turkey and in the EU 
– with a fast growing population in Turkey and a declining and aging population in the EU 
– and taking into account the gap in the average standard of living, there is a strong 
potential for strong migration flows from Turkey to the EU. This is one (and probably one 
of the most important) reason, why some EU countries (especially Germany and Austria) 
are concerned about applying the right of free movement in the case of Turkish workers. 
Are these fears justified by theoretical expectations or empirical evidence? 
Several econometric studies have attempted to estimate the migration potential from 
Turkey into the EU. They can be categorized into two groups. One group of studies has 












2008 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050
Germany 3% 4% 5% Germany 3% 4% 5%
Annual German GDP growth is always 2% 
Annual Turkish GDP growth 9 
 
migration. Another group of studies has applied econometrical methods to forecast the 
migration potential. 
While polls and surveys are very popular they are not very reliable in forecasting the 
migration potential. “Migration intention” is a complicated concept whose measurement 
is fairly complex. Due to the subjectivity of the concept and its sensitivity to time, most of 
the surveys suffer from definitional absences. One of the main drawbacks of opinion polls 
and individual surveys is the biased impact of the questionnaire on the flow of answers. 
Hence, especially in the surveys, the distinction between the “intention” and “act” itself 
must be clearly underlined. Estimations depending on opinion pools are used to forecast 
the amount of expected migration flows.  
In  econometric models  several approaches are  utilized in estimating the amount of 
potential migration. Error correction models test for the equilibrium in the long run in 
which part of the population has the potential to migrate. Gravity models analyze annual 
migration potential via various explanatory variables such as stock of existing migrants in 
the country, income discrepancies, unemployment rate differentials etc. Based on earlier 
migration experiences, extrapolation models are constructed for the forecasting purposes.  
The main methodological difficulty for all of these approaches lies in the fundamental 
political and institutional change that goes along with a Turkish accession to the EU. 
Turkey becoming a member of the EU and being granted the right of free movement for 
Turkish workers means doubtlessly a unique experience with no historical blue print at all. 
Thus, if there is a case where the famous Lucas-critique is well applied, it comes with the 
changes an  EU membership for Turkey would generate.
6
Briefly summarizing the existing empirical evidence from all the different studies shortly 
indicated in box 1, one thing becomes very clear: The estimations present broadly varying 
numbers. Figures with respect to volume of potential Turkish migrants from Turkey to the 
EU range between 0.5 to 4.4 million. It is sufficient to say that the literature lacks an 
agreement on a reasonable interval with a minimum and a maximum value. The 
wideness  of the range is rather large and quite  sensitive to the data sets and 
methodologies that are applied, which brings the reliability of numbers into discussion. 
  The methodological key 
questions are: how far can we (1) use experiences in the past to learn something for the 
future and (2) speculate about the migration potential from Turkey to the EU after such a 
fundamental change from strong to no restrictions has taken place? 
                                                           
6 The Lucas-critique is “that any change in policy will systematically alter the structure of econometric 
models. ... (This conclusion) is fundamental; for it implies that comparisons of the effects of alternative 
policy rules using current macro econometric models are invalid regardless of the performance of these 
models over the sample period or in ex ante short-term forecasting.” Lucas, Robert E.: Econometric Policy 
Evaluation: A Critique, in: Karl Brunner and Allan H. Meltzer (eds.): Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on 
Public Policy, Vol. 1, 1976, p. 41. The Lucas-critique refers to the level of consistency and invariance over time 
and space. It is about the correctness of an extrapolation from past migration patterns to expected 
migration behaviour and it is about the possibilities of applying empirical migration experiences from one 
area to another. Some scholars try to overcome this fundamental methodological problem by the inclusion 
of so-called country-specific effects. In most econometric forecasts the country-specific aspects are captured 
by a country-specific intercept which remains constant over time. However, it remains more than crucial 
how the country-specific intercept is defined and applied to Turkey that has had no historical experience of 
free migration to Europe. 10 
 
Box 1: Survey over Different Empirical Studies Estimating the Migration Potential from Turkey to the EU 
under the Conditions of Free Migration 
Togan  (2002) makes a forecast of free Turkish migration to Germany. He  concludes  that the Turkish 
immigrant population starts out at about 2.2 million in 2000 and reaches about 3.5 million in 2030 under 
the assumption of zero restriction on migration.  
His findings are confirmed by Flam (2003).  
Lejour et al. (2004) expect that 2.7 million people will permanently move from Turkey to the EU in the longer 
term. The majority of these people will settle in Germany, where Turks have settled in the past as well.  
Erzan et. al. (2006) estimate that net migration from Turkey to the EU-15 over the period 2004-2030 is 
between 1 and 1.2 million foreseeing a successful accession period with high growth and free mobility 
starting 2015.   According to another scenario under the low growth rates accompanied by non-free 
movement, Erzan et al. (2006) estimate that emigration flows from Turkey in 2030 exceeds 2.7 million.  
Quasier and Reppegather (2004) forecast, in the absence of transition periods and with full application of 
free movement as from 2013, the long term potential migration from Turkey to Germany at 4.4 million.  
Krieger and Maitre (2006) predict a migration potential of 3.03 million. 
 
References: 
Erzan, R., Kuzubas U. and N.Yildiz (2006): Immigration Scenarios: Turkey-EU. Turkish Studies, Vol. 7. No 1, 33-
44.  
Flam, H. (2003): Turkey and the EU: Politics and Economics of Accession. CESIFO Working Paper No 893. 
Krieger, H. and B. Maitre (2006): Migration Trends in an Enlarging European Union. Turkish Studies. Vol. 7, 
No 1, 45-66. 
Lejour, A. M, R.A. de Mooij and C. H. Capel (2004): Assessing the Economic Implications of Turkish Accession 
to the EU.CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis, No 56. 
Quasier,  W. and A.  Reppegather  (2004): EU-  Beitrittsreife der Türkei und Konsequenzen einer EU-
Mitgliedschaft. Osteuropa Institut München, Working Paper, No 252. 
Togan, S. (2004): Turkey: Toward EU Accession. World Economy, Vol. 27, No 7, 1013-1045 
 
 
Forecasting the approximate volume of potential migration is quite necessary especially 
for policy makers. However such controversial studies are not sufficient. One should be 
cautious when approaching the estimation literature since the range is rather wide, the 
quality of the data is poor and the methodologies are unclear and inconsistent. Moreover, 
the focus of the debate should rather shift to the profile, the structure, the dynamics, the 
regional distribution, trends and mechanisms of potential migration flows  and to the 
motivation of migrants to come to Europe. 
Actually, the question is not so much, how many Turkish workers would take use of the 
right to move freely. The right question is: how many more (or even less) would move 
compared to a situation with no right of free movement. Erzan et al. (2006) show that if 
Turkey’s membership process is endangered and high growth cannot be sustained, 2.7 
million people may be penetrating the EU-15 despite the restrictions on the labor 
mobility.  This is more than in a scenario with a Turkish EU membership and free 
movement for Turkish workers. Thus, it is not unrealistic to expect, that under the lack of 11 
 
full EU membership and free movement of labor, Turkish migration flows towards the EU 
will be even at higher levels. The migration experience after the Eastern enlargement has 
shown that the actual migration flows are fairly below the expected levels, following the 
accession. It might be, that something like a migration hump will be the most realistic 
scenario (see figure 6). There will be an increase of migration flows firstly, just after the 
right of free movement is granted. But after a while, it will decrease. 
 
Figure 6: The Migration Hump 













Source: Martin, Philip, Trade and Migration: NAFTA and AGRICULTURE. Washington 
(Institute for International Economics) 1993, page 136. 
 
What we have learnt from the EU experience in the past is that if labor has the legal right 
to move freely, this makes people (especially in border areas) more mobile internationally, 
but it does not in itself induce mass migration from one country to another. People's 
social and cultural ties to their local environment are an important obstacle to migration 
which has commonly been underestimated from the perspective of theoretical economics 
and has not been taken into account seriously enough in the structural migration 
(forecasting) models. 
On the macroeconomic level international labor migration within the common EU labor 
market has proved to be mainly demand-determined: it usually depends to a major extent 
on the needs and employment opportunities in the immigration  countries. In the EU, 
trade has reacted much faster and more elastically to economic integration than labor. 
The removal of formal and informal protectionist impediments led to a strong increase in 
intra-community trade. The equalization of goods and factor prices expected by 12 
 
arguments of the international economic theory thus materialized through trade rather 
than through the increased mobility of labor. To an important degree, trade has replaced 
the economic demand for migration in the EU. In brief: having the option to migrate within 
a common labor market has turned out to be the most effective anti-migration policy! 
 
4. Conclusions 
Due to migration network effects dependants and relatives of Turkish migrants living in 
the EU already will have a high probability to migrate to the EU as Turkey becomes part of 
the EU. The number of student migrants (which is already high because of exchange 
programs) will have a tendency to increase since students tend to integrate more easily 
because they are younger and they are not confronted with insurmountable language 
obstacles. With respect to labor migration, flows will take place at every skill level. 
Emigration  and also remigration of high-skilled Turkish workers will become more 
distinct. Ethnically discriminated  groups’  potential to migrate may have a decreasing 
trend under the new regulations of the EU that are protecting their rights as well. Finally, 
circular migration will be the new form of immigration flows due to the free mobility.  
These arguments create expectations for rather strong migration flows. However, there 
are some other factors that moderate at least partly these expectations. Along with being 
integrated in the EU some strong growth stimulating impacts might improve 
substantially the average standard of living. The removal of obstacles to trade and the 
integration of international finance markets make trade in goods and services easier. It 
makes capital and know-how more mobile internationally. Labor migration thus becomes 
increasingly dependent on the progressive liberalization of trade in goods and services 
and the international mobility of capital.  
Interestingly enough, it is not only the level of the standard of living but also the 
improvement that influences the individual migration decision. If people expect that life is 
going better in their home country and that at least their children will have better options 
they might stay even if they could improve their standard of living in the short run by 
migrating. 
Push and pull factors behind the potential migration are of great importance. With the 
possible membership to the EU, Turkey should consider revising these factors in its 
historical context so as to find policy solutions to eliminate the pushing factors and 
improve the pulling ones. Considering the low wages and high unemployment as the 
main pushing factors behind the potential for labor migration, Turkey can develop policy 
measures to deal with these issues. This, inevitably, requires structural and institutional 
reforms that are stabilizing the Turkish economy. Better living standards which are closer 
to the EU average would decrease the motivation of Turks to migrate towards Europe. EU 
membership helps to reach this goal. Therefore, EU membership might not provoke more 
but rather less migration from Turkey to the EU. HWWI Policy Papers
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